DocsUpdated: February 20269 min read

Security Model

Threat model assumptions, crypto primitives, and what Quilon can/cannot access.

Crypto Primitives

  • AES-256-CBC for confidentiality
  • HMAC-SHA256 for integrity (encrypt-then-MAC)
  • PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with 310,000 iterations for key derivation
  • Timing-safe comparison for MAC verification paths

Zero-Knowledge Scope

User content is encrypted before transmission and decrypted client-side.

Server can observe session metadata needed for routing (for example socket IDs and approximate transfer shape), but not plaintext payload.

Threat Assumptions

  • Client endpoints are trusted by their owner; compromised endpoint compromises local data
  • TLS protects transport channel from passive network interception
  • Backend compromise should not reveal plaintext clip/file content
  • Abuse controls reduce but do not eliminate volumetric denial-of-service risk

Security Non-Goals

  • Quilon does not provide endpoint malware protection
  • Quilon does not hide traffic timing/volume metadata from network observers
  • Quilon does not replace full DLP compliance tooling by itself

Full Security Policy

For full legal/security statement and disclosure process, see the dedicated security page.

Referencetext
https://quilon.dev/security